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WEST VIBGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY
HAS A PERSON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
ABSTAIN FROM WORK?*
By WnjAm F. KEEm.**
At first blush it would seem preposterous that, in a free country
like ours, a person might be required to work whether he willed to
do so or not. But, upon more mature reflection, we discover that
it is difficult, indeed, to find in our Constitutions any guaranty of
the right-if I may be permitted herein to use the expression-of
the right to loaf.
Most of the American states have adopted the common law of
England as modified by such statutes as Parliament had enacted
up to the time of the separation from the "mother country," as
the "law of the land."' But they have also made their constitu-
tions supreme, and the common law to give way to enactments of
the legislatures. And the legislatures have been left comparatively
unshackled. The few and limited restrictions imposed by the
Constitution of the United States upon the legislatures of the
States were only such as were essential to the existence of a cen-
tralized national government. The genius of our laws is such that,
unless the legislatures are denied the right to enact a law depriv-
ing persons of their right to loaf, it may reasonably be assumed
that they may do so.
2
The common law of England, as adopted in our country, imposed
no affirmative duties on a person as such. Its policy was to en-
* The James F. Brown Prize Thesis. 1921-1922. In 1919 the late James F.
Brown, of the Class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University, the proceeds to be
invested by it and the income used as a prize for the best essay each year on the
subject of the individual liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Any senior or any graduate of any college of the University, within one year
after receiving any bachelor's degree, may compete for this prize. This was the
second award of this prize.
** LL. B., West Virginia University, 1922, of Wheeling, W. Va. Bar.
See, for instance, CONSTITUTION W. VA. ART. 8, § 21.
5 See 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *160, where It is said: "The power and
jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute,
that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds ....
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military,
maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power,
which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution'
of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that
transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary
tribunal .... It can, in short, do everything that Is not naturally impossible ..
Cf. 20 COL. L. lEv. 438 et seq.
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,courage activity, but there was no positive requirement that a per-
son perform any affirmative acts. So long as a person could
support himself and his family, or was supported by some friend
or relative, so that he was not a charge on society, or the state, the
law let him alone. He was allowed to loaf.
Any law which requires a person to work, places upon him an
affirmative duty. Such a law, therefore, cannot be a part of the
so-called common law. If it exists at all, it must be by legislative
enactment.
Let us suppose that a law be enacted providing that every able-
bodied male person, and every able-bodied unmarried female per-
son, between the ages of eighteen and sixty, except bona-fide stu-
dents during school term, persons temporarily unemployed by
reason of differences with their employers, and persons fitting
themselves to engage in trade or industrial pursuits, must engage
in some useful or lawful occupation, employment, trade, business,
profession or calling. for at least thirty-six hours a week, and that
any person who fails to comply with the provisions of this act
shall, regardless of his ability or inability to support himself and
his dependents be considered a vagrant and punishable as such.3
That is, let us suppose the enactment of a law of this kind free
from every objection except the one in question, viz., that it de-
prives a person of his "constitutional right" to loaf. For the want
of a better name and for the sake of brevity, a law of this general
nature will hereinafter be referred to as an industry law.
In the United States, persons, with a few exceptions, are subject
to two legislatures: (1) the Congress of the United States, and
(2) the legislature of the State wherein they reside. If, then, a
person is to be required to work, it must be the result of an enact-
ment of one or both of these legislatures.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION.
First, let us consider the power of the federal legislature to pass
an industry law. The government of the United States, being
one of delegated powers, Congress can enact no law unless power
to do so is granted, either expressly or impliedly, by the Constitl-
tion.4 In inquiring whether Congress has power to pass an in-
s Cf. the so-called Council of Defense Acts, e.g., ACTS oF W. VA., 1917. C 12, § 2.
it is submitted that a statute of this kind is essentially different from the English
-tatutes of labourers of 1349, 1350 and 1562, for the reason that those statutes
"required able-bodied persons not having means of their own to accept service when
offered, on pain of imprisonment, and to take the customary wages, or . . . . wages
fixed by justices of the peace." FREUND, POLICE POWER, § 448. Under the law pro-
posed, a person might work for himself.
4 U. S. CONST., AMENDMENT X.
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dustry law, it will probably be well, inasmuch as the powers of
Congress in times of war are almost immeasurably enlarged over
those which it possesses in times of peace, to consider the power in
each of these two cases separately.
If Congress may, in times of peace, enact an industry law, the
power would probably have to be derived from the "common de-
fense and general welfare" clause.5 It will probably not be se-
riously contended that Congress has any such power, especially
with reference to persons living within one of the States. How-
ever, under the clause giving Congress power to legislate for the
District of Columbia and for the territories, it could probably
enact any laws that a State could enact for its own people. The
extent to which this might be done, therefore, will be treated here-
inafter, in conjunction with the same power of the various States.
In times of war, however, Congress has power "to raise and
support armies ' 7 and "to provide and maintain a navy."8 The
limit of the powers of Congress under these clauses, like most of its
constitutional powers, has not been, and probably never will be,
definitely defined. That the war power of Congress is almost
limitless is generally conceded. Certainly it warrants Congress
in enacting any law necessary for carrying to successful com-
pletion any war in which the United States may become engaged;
and at the present time, and in the future when wars consist and
will consist, not of a series of engagements between army and
army, but of one continuous struggle between nation and nation,
involving not only the man-power, but also the physical wealth
of the entire nation, it seems that Congress would be warranted,
under the war power, in enacting any law necessary to
increase the national wealth. That a law requiring the individual
to do some useful work is a law which would contribute to the pro-
duction of national wealth, is too clear for argument. And
that the entire wealth of the nation must be subject to call in
times of war, in order "to support armies" and "to maintain a
navy" of the magnitude of those which must be called into exis-
tence in modem warfare, is a fact of which the last, decade fur-
nishes ample proof.
Unless, therefore, the Constitution imposes upon Congress some
limitation, it seems that it should be held warranted in enacting a
law of the kind in question. If there is any such limitation upon
Sibid. ART. 1, 1 8. [l]
M Ibi. ART. I, § 8. (17]
' Ibid. A.T. 1, 8. [12]. (Italic.r ours.)
8 Ibid . ART. I, I 8. [13]. (Italics ours.)
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the power of Congress, it is probably to be found only in the Fifth
and Thirteenth Amendments. The only !clause in the Fifth
Amendment which, it might be argued, limits the power is that
"no person shall .... be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law ..... "
That such a law would not be a deprivation "of life" is clear.
That provision is intended to secure a person against execution
"without due process of law," that is, without having been first
indicted, tried by a competent tribunal, including a jury of his
peers, and convicted of some crime for which an execution is the
proper punishment.9
But is it a deprivation "of liberty . . . without due process of
law?" This question might be thought to involve two questions,
viz., (1) whether there is a deprivation of liberty, and (2) whether
there is due process of law. But the latter often, indeed generally,
depends upon the nature of the "right" of which the person is
alleged to have been deprived without due process of law. These
two questions, therefore, should be considered together.
That legislative acts have been held to be a denial of due process
in proper cases has long been established.10 But many statutes
which encroach upon some of the "inalienable rights" of "all"".
men have been held not to be a violation of due process. 2 Whether
or not, then, a certain statute is a denial of due process of law
depends largely upon the nature of the alleged right to secure
which the protection of this clause is invoked.
The word "liberty," as used in the Constitution, is a term of
"convenient vagueness""3-of changing significance. Like "due
9 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884). See also 1 BLACxSToxN,
COmAENTAmPIs, 133-134.
10 See Den d. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272,
(U. S. 1856). As said in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884). '"Ap-
plied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, herm
they [those clauses in the Constitution guarding life, liberty and property from
deprivation without due procers of law] have become bulwarks also against arbitrary
legislation
'1 Observe that the framers of the Declaration of Independence obviously did not
intend to include negroes in the term "all men" as there used.
13 E. g., a law requiring all persons to be vaccinated. See Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905). See also 12 C. J. 913-914. And see notes 17 and
49, post.
i3 Charles N. Hough, In an article entitled "Due Process of Law-Today," 32:
EAPV. L. Ray. 218 says: "My excuse for this address is a belief that the ancient
words do not (various courts to the contrary, notwithstanding) speak to us with
the same voice, or connote the same mental assumptions, or suggest the same back-
grounds, political and social, as they did two generations ago, or even when my
generation at the bar took the professional oath .......
the phrase is of convenient vagueness; forty years ago our highest courts said
that it could not be defined, or at all events definition was declined, because it was
better to ascertain meaning in each case by a process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion ..."It is putting the same thought in another way to say that the historical test
is not final, for to hold that what was once due process must always remain so
'would stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws or
the Medes and Persians'......
"I attempt no definition of that word, observing that Moses, Blackstone, and
Mr. James Coolidge Carter have not permanently succeeded. .. "
4
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process of law," it depends for its definition largely upon the
time, the place and the prevailing public opinion where it is as-
serted. The liberties which our forefathers who framed the Con-
stitution might claim are not necessarily the same as those which
we claim today."4 That was a different time from the present.
Vast and unthought-of changes have taken place since then. The
country then was new and undeveloped; today it is developed be-
yond many countries which have been inhabited by civilized
peoples for much longer periods. The population has increased
immensely. The relative extent of their rights and ours might be
compared to the "rights" of a man standing on a large platform.
While he is there alone he may swing his arms wildly and engage
in all kinds of gymnastic "stunts"--we say he has a "right" to
do so; but let the platform become crowded with others, then his
"rights" to engage in such pranks are necessarily restricted in
order that the rights of others may not be infringed. Indeed,
his right to do anything is restricted by the intervention of the
corresponding rights of others, occupants of the platform, and he
must then be careful even where he steps lest he tread upon the
toes of his neighbor.15 Just so it is today. And has not the pre-
vailing public opinion of what constitutes "liberty" changed in
proportion as the population of the country has grown? As one
example of the change of public opinion, consider the case of
Block v. Hirsch," in which the Supreme Court, which is even in-
fluenced at times by prevailing public opinion, decided that pri-
vately owned houses within the city of Washington were impressed
with a sufficient social interest to justify governmental regula-
tion of the letting thereof, and the price which the owner might
charge as rent.1 7 That such a decision would have been unthink-
able one hundred fifty years ago will no doubt be universally
conceded. Yet coming, as it did, in the year 1921, it hardly cre-
ated a stir except among a few fossilized legal minds of the old
school which is rapidly "crossing the bar." Thus it seems that
one's liberties today are not necessarily what they were a century
and a half ago. Especially must our vaunted "liberties" give
24 Hurtado v. California, supra.
I- f. Oliver W. Holmes, "Natural Law," 32 HAnV. L. Itv. 40.
16 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 531 (1921).
'IT Cf. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911), In which the "right"
to conduct a banking business as the banker pleased was restricted for the public
good; The Pipe Line cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914), in which the "right" of the
pipe line companies to refuse to transport oil for others was ruthlessly trampled
upon; State v. Howatt, 198 Pac. 686 (Kans. 1921), in which the "right" of coal
miners to strike pending an investigation was denied; People v. United Mine
Workers of America, 201 Pac. 54 (Colo. 1921), to the same.effect.
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way to the exigencies of national self-preservation in great crises
like modern warfare.
What is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, then,
should depend upon the time, the place and the prevailing public
opinion. Whether the prevailing public opinion in the United
States at the present time, if the government should become in-
volved in another war, would sanction a law of the kind in ques-
tion may be debatable. It seems, however, that consistently with
other holdings along the same line,18 the Supreme Court could do
naught but sustain it. Under the war power the Supreme Court
has found justification for the Federal Selective Draft law, 9
calling to the defense of the nation all the able-bodied male cit-
izens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The draft law
required these men to leave their homes, to give to their country
their entire time for twenty-four hours a day, if need be, with what
compensation the government saw fit to allow them. It took them
from their homes, transported theni to other parts of the country,
placed them in training camps which they were forbidden to leave
without permission. It transported them to a foreign country,
whether against their will or not. Could there be a greater depri-
vation of the citizen's sacred "inalienable" right of "liberty"?
Yet our Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress, under the
war power, to do all this.20 Could it, then, consistently with rea-
son, right and justice, deny to that same tribunal, in times of war,
the power to require those who remain at home-who reap prac-
tically all the benefits of war and bear practically none of the
burdens-to engage for a certain reasonable number, say thirty-
six, not one hundred and sixty-eight as in the case of the soldier,
of hours a week in some useful occupation in order to "support"
the army and to "maintain" the navy, regardless of the number
of dollars (which in times of war may be unavailable to feed an
army or navy) that he may possess? Would not the Court rather
uphold the power of Congress to pass such a law, stating as it
stated in the Selective Draft Cases, that an attempt to deny its
power "would seem to be too frivolous for further notice?"'"
We come, now to the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides
that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . . shall exist
28 E. g., Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
29 See BRR Es FtDERAL CODE, 1919, §§ 10221-10247.
0 Selective Draft Cases, supra. See also United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423
(1917); Story v. Perkins 243 Fed. 997 (1917) ; Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54
(1917); Claudius v. Davie, 175 Cal. 208, 165 Pac. 689 (1917) ; Jones v. Perkins,
245 U. S. 390 (1918). And see 4 IA. L. BuLL. 122.
- 245 U. S. 366, 377 (1918).
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within the United States . . .". This provision places a restric-
tion upon the federal government as well as upon the States.
But would it preclude the passage, by Congress, in times of war,
of such a law as that in question? If the service required is
"slavery" or "involuntary servitude," it would ;22 otherwise not.
That such a law would not enslave any one is too clear for words.
Slavery necessarily implies that there is a master who gets the
benefit of the labor of the slave without according to him any re-
turn, except such as from the goodness of his heart he sees fit to
give. 2 3 Such a law as that in question places no person under the
authority of another against his will. Every man is left free to
work for whomsoever he will, or to work for himself, just so he
works. Nor is anybody but himself entitled to the rewards of his
labor-they accrue to him entirely. It does not deny a person the
right to change his employment when and as often as he may
wish. Surely no one would seriously, contend that a person under
such a law would be a slave within the meaning of the term "sla-
ery" as used in the Thirteenth Amendment.2
Nor would such a law impose "involuntary servitude" upon a
person. That term has much the same meaning as "slavery."
This amendment made peonage, as well as slavery, unlawful.
21
Yet peonage, and all other forms of involuntary servitude that
are not properly considered slavery, are like slavery in many res-
pects. They imply that there is a master to whom one is bound,
whether for pay or not. The law in question would not bind any
one to serve any other. It would, therefore, be free from the impu-
tation of such an objection. It would be much less involuntary
servitude than is service, in many cases, under a seaman's contract
of service. Yet the seaman is not discharged from his obligation
to work for the master of the vessel, on the plea that he no longer
desires to do so.' It would, indeed, impose much less of slavery or
involuntary servitude upon a person than was imposed upon some
See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, (U. S. 1866).
23See In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (1886). "All understand by these terms
[slavery and involuntary servitude] a condition of enforced compulsory service of
one to another." Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 16 (1905). (Italics ours.)
"Slavery implies the relation of two persons in the character of master and slave..."
De Lacy v. Antoine, 7 Leigh 438, 445 (Va. 1836). See also Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U. S. 219 (1911), in which Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said
(p. 241), "The plain intention [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to abolish
slavery of whatever name and form, with all its badges and incidents; to render
impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by
which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit
which is the essence of involuntary servitude." (Italics ours.)
5' See note 71, post.
Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671 (1903) ; Clyatt v. United States 197 U. S. 207
(1915) ; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911); United States v. Reynolds, 234
U. S. 133 (1914) ; Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29, 74 So. 17 (1917) ; State v. Oliva,
144 La. 51, 80 So. 195 (1918) ; Shaw v. Fisher. 102 S. B. 325 (S. C. 1920).
m Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897).
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by the Selective Draft LawY.2  In the Selective Draft Cases,23 Mr.
Chief Justice White, speaking of the contention that the law vio-
lated the Thirteenth Amendment, said, .... . we are constrained
to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its
mere statement."2 Reasoning by analogy, then, which in this con-
nection is the lest we can do, it seems that the Supreme Court
could not consistently with reason do aught but uphold the power
of Congress to enact, in times of war, legislation of this char-
acter.
II. STATE LEGISLATION.
Since all the legislative power existed originally in the States,
it is not necessary with respect to them, as it is with respect to
the Federal government, to find power or authority under the
Constitution to enact legislation of the kind in question. The
States possessed the power inherently; and that power is generally
called the police power.30 All we need to consider, then, in this
connection, is whether the Constitution contains any limitations
upon that power. And inasmuch as a State, as well as the Fed-
eral government, may be justified in times of war in passing laws
which it might not be justified in enacting in times of peace, we
shall consider the latter aspect of the problem first.
The police power of the State, like due process of law, has never
been, and probably never will be, definitely defined. It is broadly
spoken of as: .
" . . . that inherent sovereignty which it is the right and
duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever
public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of
society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health,
order, or to insure in any respect suclh economic conditions as
an advancing civilization of a 'highly complex character re-
quires."1
3
" . . . the general power of governing its people and domin-
ions belonging to every sovereignty. 
3 2
The Supreme Court has defined the police power of the States
to be the power
v Ante, note 19.
28 Ante, note 20.
245 U. S. 366, 390 (1918).
" See FElD, POLICE POWER, § 3 et seq.
8 See Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 531, 189 Pac. 743, 747 (1914). (ItalIos
ours.)~'See Allyn's App., 51 Conn. 534, 538, 71 At!. 794, 796 (1909).
8
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" .. . to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace.
morals, education and good order of the people, and to leg-
islate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its,
resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."8
In other words, it is the power of a State to do whatever it deems;
necessary or desirable for the general welfare-the general good-
of its people. And the only restraints upon it are such as are im-
posed by the constitutions, both State and Federal.
It seems that definition of the power gets us nowhere in thig
discussion, for we are still left to find what constitutional limita-
tions are imposed upon the power. And here, again the restraints
which the Constitution imposes depend upon the nature of the
law which the legislature has enacted. As we are here concerned
only with those restraints which the Constitution of the United
States imposes upon the power of the States to enact laws of the
kind in question, it seems that the only Federal restrictions upon
that power are to be found in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
8 4
Since the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, there have
been many appeals to its protection. Yet none of them have been
productive of the desired results except those cases in which the
benefits of one man's labor have accrued to some one else, such
as peonage,8 5 and child labor cases.3 6  Apparently it never has
been, and likely never will be, applied to a case which lacks the
element of servitude of one man to another as master.8 7 Public
service-serving the State-never has been considered as coming
within the amendment; objections to working on the public roads, 88
jury service, 9 militia service, 40 compulsory assistance in making
arrests,41 and the like have always been over-ruled. Why, then,
should a law which requires a person to serve nobody in particular
be held a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment?
In the Fourteenth Amendment there are three clauses which, by
a stretch of the imagination, might be considered infringed by
3 See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885). (Italics ours.) See also,
Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912).
34 The first ten amendments place no restriction upon the States; they relate only
to the Federal government. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (U. S. 1883).
Is Ante, note 25.
31 See United States v. Anacarola, 1 Fed. 676, 17 Blatchf. 423 (1880).
37 See note 23, ante.
" E. g., see W. VA. CODE, c. 43 § 12. "In 1889 the statutes of 27 states provided
for such labor on public roads." Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916).
Be E. g., see W. VA. Con, C. 116, § 1. And see, sustaining the constitutionality
of this statute, State v. Mounts, 86 W. Va. 179, 14 S. E. 407 (1892) ; State v. Scott.
36 W. Va. 704, 15 S. E. 905 (1892).
4o H. g., see W. VA. CODE, c. 18, § 2.
"a E. g., see W. VA. CODE, c. 148, § 1. See also Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328,.
332-333 (1916). Cf. FEUND, POLICE: POWER, § 614.
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an industry law, viz., (1) the "privileges and immunities" clause,
(2) the "equal protection of the laws" clause, and (3) the "due
process" clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia, that "no state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." The "privileges
and immunities" protected by this clause which are not amply and
with more exactness and certainty protected by other provisions
in the Constitution, have been searched for in vain.
"It is only when the party aggrieved by a state law can find
no Federal guaranty of right based upon a specific provision
of the Constitution and feels, nevertheless, that some 'inalien-
able right' is being violated, that he falls back upon the 'priv-
ileges and immunities' clause, thinking that surely in words
of such glittering promise there must be some substance of
civil rights not elsewhere found. But in every case to date
has grasped for substance and found only shadow." 42
The second provision of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to
provides that "no state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The primary pur-
pose of this provision is
" . .. to prevent state Legislatures from making discrimina-
tions without any basis; in other words to do away with class
legislation. 4 3s
It is not aimed at a statute which applies equally to all within the
State. The only objection, under this provision, that could be
raised to the law in question is that the classifications of persons
as to age, sex, status, and the like, are "without any basis."
That the law in question would be, or could be made, unobjection-
able in this respect, seems indisputable.
The other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that might
be expected to prohibit legislation of the kind in question is that
2 Stanley C. Morris, "What are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of
the United States?," 28 W. VA. LAW QuAn. 38, 54. See also D. C. McGovney,
"Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment." 4 IA. L. BULL. 219, in
particular 222-223, where he says: "In fact this clause of the Constitution has
almost a one hundred per cent. record of attempted misapplications. Though over
forty cases have come before the Supreme Court of the United States In which a con-
tention has been made-of State abridgment of an alleged privilege or immunity
protected by this clause, in not a single instance has the court so held. The
syllabi of State decisions indicate that lawyers have made like contentions and
likewise to no avail, in about three hundred cases. The few State decisions In which
the courts have agreed that an alleged privilege or Immunity was within this protec-
tion seem to have been erroneously decided."
3 See People v. Metz, 192 N. Y. 148, 160, 85 N. E. 1070, 1074 (1908).
10
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clause providing that "no state shall .. . deprive any person of
... liberty... without due process of law."
The word "liberty," as used in the Constitution, has been some-
what loosely defined to mean
" . ..not merely the right to go where one chooses, but to
do such acts as he may judge best for his interests, not incon-
sistent with the equal rights of other's; that is to follow such
pursuits as may be best adapted to his faculties, and which
will give him the highest enjoyment. The liberty mentioned
is deemed to embrace the rights of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work [but not to loaf] where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, and for that pur-
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclu-
sion the purpose above mentioned. '"4 4
Even this definition, which undoubtedly gives the word "lib-
erty" all due breadth of scope, tacitly admits that it is a variable
conception, dependent upon the "equal rights of others. "4 5 Ob-
viously, the "liberty" of a person and the "equal rights of others"
may be different in times of peace from what they are in times of
war. Perhaps I may be pardoned, therefore, for again going into
this subject. An eminent writer has said that
" . . . it is worth noticing that in this connection the word
and clause with which we are dealing are in almost every in-
stance inserted in a section of the constitution dealing exclus-
ively with the conduct of criminal trials, with the privileges
of the accused, with a process in which the whole question is
whether the person concerned shall be deprived of one or the
other of certain rights; that is, of life, or personal liberty, or
property as a penalty for crime; and it is declared that he
shall not, without due process of law. A priori, therefore, it
See Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 862, 45 S. E. 327, (1903). (Italics
ours.) The latter part of this quotation is about the same as that given by Sir
William Blackstone more than one hundred and fifty years ago. See note 52, post.
See also In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 106; and in general cases cited 12 C. J. 936 n.
67. The right of contract Is generally considered as protected by this provision of the
Constitution; yet even this right must give way to laws which are a legitimate
exercise of the police power. See Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co., V. Public Service
Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557 (1919). Cf. FREuND, PoLicE Pow"R,
§ 445 et seq.
" In Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 89 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657, 661 (1914), it is
said: "The 'liberty' guaranteed by the Constitution is liberty regulated by law and
the social compact; and in order that all men may enjoy liberty it is but- the
tritest truism to say that every man must renounce unbridled license. So wherever
the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other
citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulations of municipal law." (Italics ours.) The courts are no longer
defining the "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution in such all-inclusive terms as
those used in cases decided a few decades ago. Of., for instance, People v. Gilson,
109 N. Y. 398, 17 N. E. 343 (1888).
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would seem that in this connection the term is not used in its
broadest sense to denote all civil rights, but, like the term
'life' and 'property' to denote one particular kind of civil
right, of which the law is accustomed to deprive persons by
way of punishment.""
Suppose, however, that an industry law be considered a depri-
vation of liberty in the sense in which that term is used in the
Constitution. Still, such a law is not forbidden if it be due pro-
cess of law. And, as before stated, what is due process of law is
also a variable conception. As has been aptly stated
" .. . the highest court and most high courts have refused
to regard constitutions as codes, and of late years have more
and more made due process of law whatever process seems
due to the demands of the times, as understood by the judges
of the time being.
"The direct appeal of property to due process has for the
most part failed; and apparent successes have but taught
legislators how to arrive at the same result in another way.
The indirect appeal through liberty is still going on, for the
American belief that every freeman can do what he likes,
where and when he pleases, as long as he dose not infringe the
moral law as expressed in the usual criminal code, dies very
hard. But it is dying, and the courts, when invoked today
under the due-process clause, are doing little more than easing
the patient's later days. "1
7
And again
" .. .more pitfalls have been prepared for him who com-
plains of undue process than for any other litigant, in what
is usually a court of generous practice.
"If decision cannot be avoided, presumptions are next con-
sidered,-such as the prima facie constitutionality of any act;
that what is enacted expresses the public policy of the state,
or that what is complained of is matter of discretion,-which
is not reached by the clause."s4
In the last analysis, whether or not a State may restrain the
individual's "inalienable right" to loaf would likely depend upon
whether or not, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, such a
restraint is reasonable.49 Whether, at the present time, consider-
Charles E. Shattuck, "The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty' in those Clauses
in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect 'Life, Liberty, and Property'."
4 HAnv. L. REv. 365, 369. (Italics ours.)
47 Charles M. Hough, "Due Process of Law--Today." 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 233.(Italics ours.)
is Ibid., p. 230.
40 As remarked by Mr. Justice Holmes, in his justly famous dissenting opinion
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ing the present condition of our resources, our industries, our man-
ifold and complex social relations, and the prevailing public opin-
ion, such a law, if enacted in times of peace, would be considered
reasonable is, of course, a matter largely of conjecture. Perhaps
we are not yet ready for such a law-perhaps the prevailing public
opinion, and the condition of the country, would not now justify
it. Perhaps that is why, prior to the year 1917, no such laws ex-
isted in the United States. But what bodies of men are more rep-
resentative of the people, are better able to judge, what the pre-
vailing public opinion with respect to such matters is, or whether
the "general welfare" demands such legislation, than our legis-
latures ?5 If the legislature, within its conveniently elastic police
power, deems itself warranted in enacting, in times of peace, a
law of this kind, the courts should be slow to condemn it. He who
assails it would, so we are told, encounter, in the Supreme Court,
"more pitfalls" than have been prepared for any other litigant,
in addition to the presunlption of its "prima facie constitu-
tionality. " 51
As Dean Pound, of Harvard, would probably put it,5 2 the inter-
est of the individual in being allowed to remain inactive-to loaf-
would be weighed against the interest of the state in preserving
public order and guarding the public welfare by requiring him to
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75-76 (1905): "The liberty of the citizen
to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do
the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered
with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which
taKes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. The
other day we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination law. United States and state
statutes and decision cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination are
familiar to this court. Two years ago we upheld the prohibition of sales of stock
on margins or for future delivery in the constitution of California. The decision
sustaining an eight hour law for miners is still recent. .....
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. . . I think
that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law."
G Professor Cheadle, in "Government Control of Business," 20 COL. L. REv. 438,
449, says: "The legislature is also bound by the principles of the law-but not in
the same way as the courts. The legislature, being the policy-determining branch
of the government, operating on behalf of society, may in its legislation depart
from time honored principles and adopt new ones, either when the principle de-
parted from is not fundamental in the life of the people or when the economic
or social changes have made a principle desirable." The legislature, he says, "is
peculiarly fitted to recognize new claims and interests as they arise and its decision
so to do should stand unless it clearly appears to be capricious, arbitrary or dishon-
est, or entirely out of harmony with any general social or economic view taken
by the public."
r' Statutes forbidding picketing by strikers have been upheld. Hardie-Tynes
Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 89 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914). Also statutes forbidding strikes
and lockouts pending investigation. People v. United Mine Workers of America,
201 Pac. 54 (Colo. 1921); State v. Howatt, 198 Pac. 686 (Kans. 1921). See also
note 17, ante.
2 E. g., see his "Outline of a Course in History and System of the Common
Law." Se also his "Interests of Personality," 28 HARV. L. Rlv. 343-365, 445-456;
"The End of Law as Developed In Juristic Thought," 27 HARe. L. REv. 605-628,
30 HAsV. L. R-v. 201-225.
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work, and, in addition, the interest of society as a whole in having
the social wealth increased. Considered this way, it will be seen
that the interests on one side of the scales diminish and those on
the other side correspondingly increase as our social relations be-
come gradually more and more complex. Which side is heavier at
the time the question arises, is the problem for the court.
If it be desired to find reasons which might be considered suf-
ficient to justify legislation of this kind, let us first go to Black-
stone, who has defined "liberty" in broad and liberal language."
We find him stating, "Idleness in any person whatsoever is also a
high offense against the public economy."1 4  Notice that he says
"any person whatsoever." Would we be justified in concluding
that he means rich as well as poor? And why should idleness in
any person whatsoever be a high offense against the public econ-
omy? He explains
"In China it is a maxim that if there be a man who does
not work, or a woman that is idle, in the empire, somebody
must suffer cold or hunger, the produce of the lands not being
more than sufficient, with culture, to maintain the inhab-
itants, and therefore, though the idle person may shift off
the want from himself, yet it must in the end fall somewhere.
The court, also, of Areopagus at Athens punished idleness,
and exerted a right of examining every citizen in what man-
ner he spent his time; the intention of which was, that the
Athenians, knowing they were to give an account of their
occupations, should follow only such as were laudable, and
that there might be no room left for such as lived by unlaw-
ful arts."15
This is good economics as well as good law. It is a basic and well
known principle of e~onomies-understood for hundreds of years,
as shown by the foregoing quotation-that idleness is one of the
chief causes of high prices, of want, of human misery. And it is
now well-known that high prices are one of the chief causes of
strikes, of boycotts, and even of wars. That a law aimed at the
destruction of idleness would be promotive of national prosperity,
of lower prices with more wealth with which to purchase, will
53 See 1 BLACxSTOxE, CO mENTAIES., *125: "This natural liberty consists properly
in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the
law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God
to man at his creation, when He endued him with the faculty of free will. But
every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as
the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages
of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community
has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity
is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed
to obtain it."
54 See IV BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *169. (Italics ours.)
55Ibid. (Italics ours.)
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1922], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
hardly be denied. That under such conditions the desire of work-
men to strike (especially if they knew they must not long remain
idle) would be greatly lessened. Would not the prevention of
strikes promote the general welfare? And promotion of the general
welfare is clearly one of the purposes for which the police power
exists." Perhaps, you say, this is rather far-fetched. Not quite
so far, however, as the power of the Federal government to protect
the wild game in the forests of the Northwest.
5 7
But whether it be considered that such a law would be produc-
tive of greater internal peace by preventing strikes, it cannot be
doubted that it would be productive of greater internal pros-
perity. And what is the difference between internal prosperity
and "general welfare," to the protection of which the police power
extends?
Considered concretely, what right have I to insist that one
ounce, or a half-ounce, be taken away from every loaf of bread
you buy in order to pay for my sacred right to loaf; or to insist
that you work an hour a day longer in order that I may loaf?
This, too, seems far-fetched, but it is, nevertheless, true, even
though I have plenty of money with which I may pay "spot cash"
for everything I buy. In order to make this clear, suppose that
you and I constitute a community shut off from the rest of the
world. I have plenty of money and am willing to pay you to
feed and clothe me. Suppose further that by working six hours a
day you can produce enough food and clothing for one. You
would then have to work twelve hours a day in order to feed and
clothe us both. In such a community would you not insist on ex-
ercising your "equal right" to a little rest and recreation and
refuse to produce enough to feed us both? Suppose we go a step
further and consider six persons in this community, five of whom
re "It is also settled that the police power embraces regulations designed to
promote the public convenience or the general welfare and prospekity, as well as
those in the interests of the public health, morals, or safety." Chicago, etc. L Co.
v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67. 77 (1915). .. ...... it [the police power] has, in
more recent decisions, been defined to include all those regulations designed to pro-
mote the public convenience, the general welfare, the general prosperity, and extends
to all great public needs, as well as regulations designed to promote the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety." Per Main, J., in State v. Pitney,
79 Wash. 608, 611, 140 Pac. 918, 919 (1914). And see cases cited in 12 C. J.
920 n. 56. This appears to have been overlooked by the West Virginia court in Ez
parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S. E. 327 (1920) for it says (p. 531) : " .
under the Constitution it [the police power] is confined to matters relating to the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety." It is, to say the least, dif-
ficult to reconcile this statement with that in Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, 672, 100 S. E. 557, 561 (1919) : "It is settled law
that the police power of the state embraces regulations designed to promote the
public conveniences or the general welfare and prosperity, as well as those in the
interests of the public health, morals and safety." It seems that the West Virginia
court has a way of shifting the scope of this power around so as to fit the case In
hand, no matter what it is. so as to decide it either way.
57 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
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insist on exercising their "inalienable right" to loaf. The one
who is willing to work cannot by any efforts he may put forth
feed and clothe the other five. The principles of economics-the
inevitable laws of God-would then work havoc with this "inalien-
able right" of some of these men to loaf. So would the same law op-
erate throughout the world if five-sixths of the men should assert
their "right" to loaf. This principle was well understood by Cap-
tain John Smith when he "enacted" an industry law of his own
for the early Virginia settlers, punishing all offenders with Mother
Nature's own punishment-hunger-as the alternative."8  The
principle is the same whether applied in a simple small community
or to a whole nation, or to the whole world, when considering the
right of one man to loaf; the difference is only one of degree. He
who insists on exercising his "inalienable right" to loaf deprives
somebody else of an "equal right" of another kind.5 9
"Six days [a week] shalt thou labor . . ." saith the Lord.60
Most of our religious leaders, in their fervent desire to constrain
obedience to the divine interdiction against laboring on the Sab-
bath, have overlooked this extremely important part of the com-
mandment. It is written in our Bible as the word of God Him-
self, and it is moreover, written all over the face of His green earth
in what we call laws or principles of economics which are infin-
itely more immutable than the proverbial laws of the Medes and
Persians: Thou shalt labor. And His punishments for disobe-
dience are manifold and inexorable. Should the court deny to our
legislatures the right to enact a law in conformity with a law
which God Himself has made?
That our legislatures can be depended upon to remain well
within the bounds of reason in this respect is evidenced by the
E See Captain John Smith, WoRxs, (Edward Arber Edition), Vol. I. p. 149,
quoting a speech made by Captain Smith In 1609 when he was president of the colony,
in which he said: "Countrlmen, the long experience of our late miseries, I hope Is
sufficient to persuade every one to a present correction of himselfe; and thinks
not that either my pains, or the adventurers purses, will ever maintaine you in
idlenesse and sloth. I speaks not this to you all; for diverse of you, I know,
deserve both honor and reward better than Is yet here to bee had; but the greater
part must be more Industrious, or starve. Howsoever you have bin heretofore toler-
ated by the authoritle of the Councell from that I have often commanded you; yet
seeing nowe the authoritle resteth wholly in my selfe, you must obey this for a law,
that he that will not work, shall not eate, except by sicknesse he be disabled. For
the labours of 30 or 40 honest and industrious men shall not bee consumed to main-
taine 150 Idle varlets."
so Cf. John . Cheadle, "Goverment Control of Business," 20 CoL. L. Rav. 438,
443: "It is, however, a matter of great social importance and public interest today
that cities containing millions 9f inhabitants be not left at the mercy of a rigorous
winter without fuel and food; and the state must 'recognize this fact even though
In the recognition they interfere with some phase of individual freedom of action. In
other words, freedom from restraint of the individual in even his own business
activity Is an interest which cannot be so asserted as to make society the victim,
and this is true whether the unfortunate result to society is deliberately intended&
or Is only Incidental. It is in Its last analysis a question of social necessity."
w ExoDus, 20, 9.
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many hours-of-labor statutes which have been enacted in recent
years.
61
It seems that practically the only objection that could be inter-
posed to the enforcement of an industry law is that it infringes the
person's "inalienable right" to loaf which, in any event does not
exist except relatively, whereas the reasons in its favor are many
and preponderant.
62
If this is true in times of peace, a fortiori, is it true in time of
war, for while the power "to declare war" and, incidentally, to
carry it through to a successful conclusion, is given exclusively
to the Federal government, this does not necessarily prohibit the
States from rendering assistance.63
Fortunately there are two eases dealing with this subject, one
decided by the Court of General Sessions of Deleware in 1919,4
and the other decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in 1920.65
The Deleware case arose upon a motion to quash an indictment
for violation of an industry law, or Council of Defense Act. It
was contended that the act was a violation of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The court after
affirming the auxiliary war power of the State, sustained the valid-
ity of the act as a lawful exercise of that power and of the police
power. It said
"One of the objects of the act was to aid in winning the
war by increasing the production of food and supplies and by
saving the loss incident to the maintenance of those male citi-
zens between the ages of 18 and 55 who were engaged in no
useful or lawful occupation. War cannot be carried on with-
out food and supplies, nor can food and supplies be produced
except by labor, and who are more able to labor than male
citizens between the ages of 18 and 55?' ' s
01 See for instance, the law improperly declared invalid in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. §. 45 (1905) ; the eight-hour law for miners, sustained in Holden v. Hardy,169 U. 5. 366 (1898). See BARNES FEDERAL CODE 1919, §§ 6585, 8090, 8097-8098.
8100; W. VA. CODE, C. 15R.
1 Cf[. Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra, in which
the court held that even contract rights must give way where the public convenience-
the general welfare--demanded.
6 State v. McClure, 30 Del. 265, 105 AtI. 712 (1919) wherein it is said: "Unless
the power of the several states to enact legislation beneficial to the federal govern-
ment while it is at war with a foreign country is expressly prohibited by the Con-
stitution or such prohibition is a necessary implication from other powers granted to
the federal government or denied to the states, the several states have such power."We find nothing in the Constitution either expressed or implied which would deny
to the several states such power."
"' State v. McClure, supra.
6 Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S. E. 327 (1920).
5 State v. McClure, supra, p. 714.
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Another object of the act is said to be
" . . . 1o preserve order within the state. The passage of
the act compelling male residents of the state between the ages
of 18 and 55 to be employed during the period of the war and
six months thereafter we believe was a reasonable exercise,
under the circumstances, of the police powers vested in the
Legislature ......
"It is generally known that the demands of the national
government in waging the present war have greatly curtailed
the means of preventing crime and reduced the number of
men available to protect the lives and property of the public.
It was proper for the Legislature having this in mind to pass
reasonable and just laws to preserve order within the state
and to protect the lives and property of those within its
borders providing that male residents between certain ages
should be engaged in some useful or lawful occupation. " 87
In the West Virginia case the indictment was for failure to work
as required by the statute, during the period between March 29th
and April 12th, 1920. The prisoner had been in the service
throughout the entire period of the war. He was on the firing line
when the Armistice was signed, and was not discharged until the
month of May, 1919. After having teen indicted, he filed his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying upon two grounds:
"First, that the time prescribed within which the statute was
to remain in effect had expired by limitation when petitioner
is alleged to have committed the several offenses; second, that
the said act is unconstitutional and void, being violative, (1)
of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States ...... as
Instead of deciding the case upon the first of these two grounds,
as the court might very well have done,69 the duration of the act
being limited to the period of the war and six months thereafter,
it decided the case entirely upon the second ground. The court
found that the restraint imposed by the statute upon personal lib-
erty could not be made to fit in under any of the five classes of
restraints of a public nature authorized by Mr. Cooley,70 and said
that, therefore, this restraint cannot be allowved-even in times of
Ibi.
6 See Ex parte Hudgins, supra, p. 527. The act was also claimed to be violative
of certain provisions of the West Virginia Constitution.
69 Ibid, p. 529, where it is said: "Whether the war had then ended within the
provision of this act, we need not decide, for we have reached the conclusion that the
act is unconstitutional and ought to be so declared."
7o See COOLEy, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 484. It will be noted that only one
case is cited in this work at this point, and that it supports only one class.
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war. Just where a writer, even of the calibre of Mr. Cooley, gets
the authority to lay down a rule, binding not only upon the courts,
but also upon the legislatures, in which lawful restraints upon
personal liberty are divided into five classes, and no more, is not
explained.71 Mr. Cooley should feel flattered! Surely such
weight has never before been given to the statements of a text-
book writer. If it were obvious from the nature of things that
the rule could not be otherwise, this might be all right. But in the
field of constitutional law it seems a radical departure from the
liberal policy of the Supreme Court of the United States, which
is to leave all possible latitude to the legislature in enacting laws
for the general good, and to avoid a direct decision curtailing that
power when a case can be decided upon another ground. It seems
that in this case the West Virginia court has taken a long step in
the direction of the "unchangeableness attributed to the laws of
the Medes and Persians" so justly denounced by the Supreme
Court.
72
In justification of its holding, the court said,
"If a citizen, say of fifty or fifty-five years of age, had
worked diligently earlier in life, and had laid up a compe-
tency with which to suport himself and his dependents
in his or their stations of life, that he might for the rest of
his days live in comparative ease and freedom from the bur-
dens of his earlier years, he could not defend himself on that
account nor escape the penalties imposed for a violation of
the statute, characterizing him as a vagrant and punishable
as such.'""
This is an accurate statement of the interest of the individual in be-
ing allowed to do as he pleases. But, as before stated, against
this must be weighed the interests of the State, as a juristic person
in promoting the general welfare of its inhabitants, and of society
in maintaining the production of necessary goods and in keeping
plenty within reach of all. In deciding all cases of this kind the
duty of the court should be to weigh the individual interests
against the public and social interests concerned, and to decide,
71 As observed by Professor John B. Cheadle, in his article in 20 COL. L. Rav., 438,
entitled "Government Control of Business," (p. 444) : "Human interests, as a group.
have such a growing content that arbitrary limits cannot and will not be assumed
in advance and should not be implied; and such limits should not be deemed to arise
from anything less than a strictly phrased constitutional statement of exclusion.
Human interests being the things human beings estimate as of value, new interests
are Inevitable as the race progresses; and to deny that new interests Wll constantly
arise demanding protection is to declare that we will stand witlh Joshua at Alalon.
To pretend to forecast these potential interests in any detail is an absurd assumption
of omniscience." (Italic ours.)
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 529 (1883).
v 86 W. Va., 526, 531, 103 S. E. 327, 329.
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without laying down a flat and inflexible rule or law, in favor
of the interests which, for the time being, predominate.
The court recognized that one of the principal purposes of the
legislature in enacting the law was to keep the productive re-
sources of the State up to the highest standard during the period
of the war.7 4  Yet it denied the State the right to do so. One
cannot help wondering whether the court would take the same
view of the matter if the state of West Virginia were confronted
with the task of fighting a war single-handed, without the aid of
her fory-seven sister states and the various colonial possessions of
the general government. Would not the court then look upon it
as a matter of self-preservation, and find copious and weighty
reasons for sanctioning the restraint on the personal liberty of
the individual? If so, why should it take a different view simply
because we had the help of our sister states? Why should West
Virginia be unwilling to bear her full share of the burden in a
war fought for her as well as for the other states?
It is submitted that the West Virginia court has established an
unwise precedent in denying to the state, even in times of war, the
right to require industry of those of its inhabitants who are allowed
by the Federal government to remain at home, when the Federal
government tramples all over the "equal rights" of those whom
it impresses into service. And the incongruity of it all is that the
West Virginia court looked to the same instrument-the Constitu-
tion of the United States-that the Federal government looked to
in finding its power to impress the state's inhabitant's into he
army. If the West Virginia court is, under this decision, con-
sistently to avoid, in times of war, denying "to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" it is well that the
power to draft the state's inhabitants into the army is exercised
by the Federal government, over which the West Virginia court
has no control. In other words, the justice of requiring a few to
fight the state's wars, whether they will to do so or not, while at
the same time allowing others to refuse to turn a hand to help if
7' At p. 530 the court said: "While greater production during the period of war
might be desirable, is that a subject with which the state had the right to deal?
We think not." Cf. Clifford R. Snider. "Basis of Constitutionality of Council of
Defense Acts," 27 W. VA. LAW QuAn. 171, wherein he says (p. 173) : "It is difficult
to see by what stretch of imagination the work required under the Council of
Defense Acts comes within the prohibition of these amendments [13th and 14th].
It cannot be slavery or involuntary servitude within the meaning of the 13th Amend-
ment for those required to labor are not owned as chattels, their labor and services
are not demanded for the benefit of others, and they have their full legal rights as to
the disposal of their property and services. None of their civil, political, or religious
rights are taken away. It savors of anarchy in times of an emergency to say that
there is a natural right of remaining idle. and it should be unnecessary to add that no,
such right is guaranteed by the 13th and 14th Amendments."
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they will not to do so, is not apparent. Yet this seems to be the
necessary result of the holding of the West Virginia court.
It is submitted that the courts, instead of eagerly rushing in to
safeguard the sacred "inalienable rights" of the people against
the laws of their own delegates, should proceed with extreme cau-
tion in a case of this kind, avoiding, whenever possible, holdings
which would curtail the powers of the legislature. When a direct
holding cannot be avoided, the courts should weigh with great
care the conflicting interests involved and should throw legal
sanction on the side of the balance which, for the time being, pre-
ponderates, and at the same time should reserve the right to place
its stamp of approval on the other side if and whenever the inter-
ests on that side have grown to such proportions that reason re-
quires its legal support. Only in this way can our constitutions,
which were not made for one people or one time, but for all peo-
ples and for all times, be made adequately to secure the end sought
by their framers, which is the end of law, viz., the greatest good
to the greatest number.75
5 In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920), the Supreme Court refused so to
construe the Tenth Amendment as to deny to Congress the right to protect migratory
birds, stating (through Mr. Justice Holmes), with reference to that Amendment
(p. 433), . . .when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must
be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago ........ We must consider what this country
has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved."
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